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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979,
President Carter placed an embargo on shipments of grain to the Soviet Union on
January 4, 1980.1 Apparently dissatisfied with the scope of the embargo, the In-
ternational Longshoremen's Association (ILA) announced on January 9, 1980, that
its members would refuse to handle any cargo destined for or arriving from the Soviet
Union, or carried on Soviet ships. 2 Employers, carriers, and businesses affected by
the work stoppage filed a number of suits against the ILA seeking damages and
injunctive relief, relying on two basic theories: 1) The work stoppage violated clauses
in the collective bargaining agreement that prohibited strikes during the agreement
and required the submission of disputes to arbitration;3 and 2) The work stoppage
violated the secondary boycott provisions of section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act,4 entitling the injured parties to damages under section 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act5 and permitting the National Labor Relations
Board to seek injunctive relief in federal district court under section 10(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
6
In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Association7 the employer chose the first theory, seeking to enjoin the work stoppage
pending arbitration. The United States Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted the injunction, but was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in a decision on a consolidated appeal. The Court of Appeals found that
the work stoppage was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 9 thereby invoking the Act's removal of federal court jurisdiction to issue in-
junctions in cases "involving or growing out of any labor dispute."1 0 The court also
1. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2677 (1982).
2. Id. at 2677 n.2.
3. Id.; see Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3482 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
5. Id. § 187.
6. Id. § 160(1). The following are some of the cases that have been brought under this theory: International
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626
F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980), aoffd, 630
F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980). See Note, Enjoining Political Protest Strikes, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1285 (1981); Comment,
Longshoremen's Embargo of Soviet Goods: A Secondary Boycott or a Political Protest?, 32 MERCER L. REv. 857 (1981).
7. 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
8. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
9. Id. at 465 (construing 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
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found that the strike was not over an issue that was subject to arbitration." Therefore,
following Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77012 and Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 3 the court held that the strike could not be enjoined
pending arbitration, although arbitration of the issue of whether the no-strike clause
in the contract had been violated could be compelled. 14
The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court remained the same,15 but the employ-
er also urged the Court to reconsider Buffalo Forge if it found that Buffalo Forge
applied.16 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, finding that the Act applies to
politically motivated disputes, 17 and refusing to reconsider Buffalo Forge.18 Three
Justices vigorously dissented, arguing both that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should
apply only when unions strike to "advance the economic interests of their
members"' 9 and that, even if the Act did apply, Buffalo Forge should be overruled to
permit injunctions pending arbitration of strikes in violation of no-strike clauses and
agreements to arbitrate disputes.
2 0
Jacksonville thus raises two major questions concerning federal labor law. First,
do the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply to politically
motivated work stoppages? Second, if they do, should the arbitration and no-strike
clauses in the collective-bargaining agreement bring the strike within the Boys Mar-
kets exception to the Act2 ' when the strike is not over an arbitrable grievance? This
Case Comment will focus primarily on the first question, which received surprisingly
little attention prior to Jacksonville.2 2 It will proceed from an analysis of the back-
ground and purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to a discussion of possible
approaches to the problem of applying the Act to politically motivated work stop-
pages, and will suggest an alternative rationale to support the court's holding in
Jacksonville. Primary emphasis will be on the competing policy interests: on one
hand, the Act's policy of preventing federal courts from issuing labor injunctions and
the union's interest in asserting political beliefs through work stoppages; and, on the
other hand, the employer's need for speedy relief and the general federal labor policy
11. 626 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
12. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
14. 626 F.2d 455, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1980).
15. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2679 (1982).
16. Id. at 2686 n.23.
17. Id. at 2687.
18. Id. at 2686 n.23.
19. Id. at 2688 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 2690 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that the Act does not apply
to a strike over an arbitrable grievance).
22. Prior reported cases dealing with politically motivated strikes include the following: United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975) (assumes politically motivated strike is within the Act); Khedivial
Lines, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (Act does not apply to politically motivated strikes;
case decided on other grounds); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372
(S.D. Tex. 1975) (Act does not apply to political disputes), affd mem., 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976); Harrington & Co.
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No. 1416, 356 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (Act does not apply to
politically motivated strikes). None of these cases contains an extensive analysis of the issue.
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of promoting industrial peace, specifically through arbitration of disputes. Finally,
the author will give some attention to the continuing validity of Buffalo Forge and the
existence and usefulness of employer remedies other than the labor injunction.
II. "LABOR DispuTE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
An analysis of the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to politically moti-
vated work stoppages obviously must start with an analysis of the Act itself. The Act,
passed in 1932, was a response to a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
earlier Clayton Act.23 In passing the Clayton Act, Congress intended to prevent the
federal courts from enjoining strikes as violations of the antitrust provisions of the
Sherman Act.24 The Court, however, severely limited the application of the Clayton
Act in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering25 and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone
Cutters Association.2 6 The holdings in the Duplex Printing Press and Bedford Cut
Stone line of cases resulted in strikes being routinely enjoined in their early stages,
thus effectively breaking the strikes and defeating the union's efforts to organize. 27
The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to remove this obstacle to union
organization by "taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business, ' 28
thus leaving labor disputes to be resolved by the economic power of the contesting
parties rather than by the intervention of the federal judiciary.
Accordingly, Congress provided a very broad scope for the anti-injunction pro-
tections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Act removes federal court jurisdiction "to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute" 29 with certain narrow exceptions for cases of
fraud or violence against person or property.30 The Act defines labor disputes and
cases "involving or growing out of' labor disputes very broadly. Section 13(a)
provides,
A case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves
persons who are engaged in the same industry, ... or have direct or indirect interests
therein; or who are employees of the same employer; ... whether such dispute
is ... between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more
employees or associations of employees; ... or when the case involves any conflicting
or competing interest in a "labor dispute" ..... 31
23. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53
(1976)).
24. See F. FRANKuRmEg & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 142-44 (1963); C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE
LAw 158-99 (2nd rev. ed. 1961).
25. 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding that a secondary boycott and a sympathy strike called to promote unionization at
another plant were not labor disputes under the Clayton Act because the object was not legitimate and no proximate
employer-employee relationship existed).
26. 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (refusal to work on nonunion goods not a labor dispute).
27. See F. FRANKtuRTER & N. GREENE, supra note 24, at 173-76, 200-01.
28. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
30. Id. § 104(e).
31. Id. § 113(a).
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The Act then defines "labor dispute" in section 13(c) as "any controversy concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment .... regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 32
A literal reading of section 13(a) would not require the existence of a "labor
dispute" as defined in section 13(c) for the protections of the Act to apply. Section 4
prohibits the issuance of injunctions in cases "involving or growing out of any labor
dispute," '33 and section 13(a) may be read literally as defining these cases to include
any case in which there is a dispute between an employer and employees. After
listing disputes between employer and employees as one of three types of cases that
"shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute," section 13(a) refers to the
section 13(c) definition of a "labor dispute" as a separate category of cases growing
out of labor disputes.34 Despite some support for this interpretation,35 the courts have
generally assumed that the existence of a section 13(c) labor dispute is required,
without necessarily deciding the issue. 3 6 This view may be supported by reading
section 13(a) as merely defining the parties between whom a labor dispute may arise,
with the additional requirement of a section 13(c) labor dispute.
Although the courts have read section 13(a) narrowly, they have interpreted
section 13(c) very broadly. In an early leading case the Supreme Court held picketing
by members of a community organization demanding that a store hire black em-
ployees to be protected by the Act.37 Despite the picketers' lack of more than a
tenuous interest in potential employment at the store and the lack of a dispute over
such traditional terms and conditions of employment as wages, hours, and working
conditions, the Court found that the picketers had a legitimate interest in removing
employment discrimination and noted that "[t]he Act does not concern itself with the
background or the motives of the dispute.' 38 This broad interpretation of the Act
supports the conclusions reached by one commentator that any distinction between
section 13(c) and section 13(a) is generally of little importance and that "[s]o long, at
least, as some reasonable relation to labor problems is apparent, it would seem
... that the existence of a labor dispute may properly be determined under [section
13(a)], independent of the nature of the casus belli. ' '39
The usual test of whether a dispute is a "labor dispute" within the Act has
come, therefore, to center on the existence of a present or potential employment
32. Id. § 113(c).
33. Id. § 104.
34. Id. § 113(a).
35. See, e.g., Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 21 F. Supp. 807, 823
(W.D. Mo. 1937) (Otis, J., dissenting from the opinion ofa three-judge district court), vacated, 304 U.S. 243 (1938); see
also Utilities Services Eng'g, Inc. v. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 549 F.2d 173, 176 (10th Cir. 1977)
(finding labor dispute under either § 13(a) or § 13(c)).
36. See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2679-81
(1982); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1960); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560-63 (1938); Khedivial Lines, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 50-51 (2d
Cir. 1960). At least one court expressly rejected the literal application of § 13(a), on the grounds that it would lead to
"absurd consequences." Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980).
37. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560-63 (1938).
38. Id. at 561.
39. Comment, Labor Laws-When a "Labor Dispute" Exists Within the Meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 36
MiCH. L. REv. 1146, 1150 (1938).
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relationship and a dispute connected to that relationship, rather than on the union's
motivation."' Nevertheless, commentators and courts have put forward the argument,
based on the concepts underlying the Act, that a strike must be motivated by eco-
nomic self-interest to come within the Act's definition of a "labor dispute."'"
The chief justification for preventing the federal judiciary from intervening in
labor disputes was the belief that labor should be allowed to use its economic power
to promote its interests, just as business does, even if this entails economic harm to
other parties. 42 This concept supported giving labor the right to organize and use the
resources at its disposal in "free competition with concentrated capital." 43 However,
the proponents of the Act did not necessarily intend for unions to be free to use the
weapons at their disposal for purposes other than promoting, directly or indirectly,
their economic interests. 44 A seminal work on the abuses of the labor injunction by
Professors Frankfurter (later Justice Frankfurter) and Greene, containing an argument
for the adoption of a bill they had drafted that was later enacted in modified form as
the Norris-LaGuardia Act,45 indicates that Frankfurter and Greene intended their bill
to merely define "the outposts of the concept of 'self-interest'" within which unions
could use the economic power at their disposal. 46 Moreover, Professor Charles 0.
Gregory, writing in 1949, considered the concept that intentional infliction of eco-
nomic harm by a union should be permitted only for the purpose of "pursuing
economic interests" 47 to be central to the Act and proposed the use of an "economic
interest test" for determining whether the protections of the Act should apply.4"
The Act itself, however, does not explicitly state that an economic self-interest
motive is required for its protections, and there is not much support for the economic
self-interest test in the congressional legislative history. While the congressional
debates on the Act indicate that Congress' primary concern was to protect organized
labor's efforts to improve wages and working conditions, no mention was made of an
economic self-interest requirement.4 9 Moreover, even in the analysis of Frankfurter
and Greene, economic self-interest is treated more as an underlying concept than as a
test of the application of their proposed bill. 50
The courts refused for a considerable time to adopt the economic self-interest
test. For example, the Supreme Court, in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
40. Both the majority and the dissenters in Jacksonville cited the test as being whether the employment relationship
is the "matrix of the controversy." 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2681, 2687-88 (1982) (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass'n v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (holding no labor dispute existed in controversy between fish packer and association of
fishermen who were independent contractors)).
41. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1966). The
most complete development of this concept may be found in C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 158-99 (2d rev. ed.
1961).
42. See F. Ft sKFxuTER & N. GREENE, supra note 24, at 203-05.
43. See id. at 204.
44. See id. at 199-226.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 215.
47. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 193 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
48. Id. at 156-57.
49. See generally the debates in the Senate, 75 CONG. REC. 4914 passim (1932), and in the House, 75 CONG. Rc.
5462-515 (1932).
50. See F. FRANKrnrTa' & N. GREENE, supra note 24, at 199-226; see also Recent Developments, Railroad
Secondary Boycotts: Railway Labor Act Versus Norris-LaGuardia, 42 WASH. L. REv. 935, 937 (1967).
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Co.,51 found that picketers from a community organization protesting discriminatory
hiring practices were engaged in a labor dispute, without any analysis of the tenuous
economic interests of the picketers. 52 The first explicit use of an economic self-
interest test under the Act occurred in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad.53 In Atlantic Coast Line the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found a secondary boycott by striking railroad workers of a terminal
company that serviced the trains to be under the anti-injunction protections of the
Act. 54 While recognizing that a literal reading of the Act would give this result, the
court preferred to rely on the economic self-interest test proposed by Professor
Gregory.5 5 This approach has generated substantial support, at least for its applica-
tion to cases dealing with picketing and boycotts of employers who are not being
struck.
56
Thus, two major interpretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have emerged. The
first views the Act as applying whenever a section 13(c) labor dispute, broadly
construed, exists. This view requires a finding that the dispute is reasonably con-
nected to a present or potential employment relationship.5 7 The second approach
argues that implicit in the Act is the requirement that a union may freely use its
economic power only within the broadly and hazily defined scope of its own and its
members' economic self-interest. 58 The issue of whether the Act applies to politically
motivated strikes depends largely on which interpretation of the Act is adopted.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO POLITICALLY MOTIVATED DisPuTEs
The application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to politically motivated work stop-
pages presents novel problems for which there are no clear solutions in the Act itself
or in prior case law.5 9 The analysis which follows suggests that neither the majority
nor the dissent in Jacksonville has satisfactorily solved these problems. The major-
ity's dual dispute analysis is unrealistic and inconsistent. Characterization of the
dispute as a type of boycott subject to sanctions under section 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act6 ° would be preferable. On the other hand, the dissent's eco-
nomic self-interest theory finds little support in the Act or in the background of the
Act. Therefore, it would be preferable to recognize explicitly that the Act, by its own
terms, applies to labor disputes-disputes between management and labor-
regardless of the motivation of the parties.
51. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
52. Id. at 562.
53. 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1966).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 653-54.
56. See, e.g., Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980); Western Md. R.R.
v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F. Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1979); Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 458 F. Supp.
1189 (D.S.C. 1978).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 9-40.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 5-48.
59. See supra note 22 and text accompanying notes 29-56.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
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A. The Dual Dispute Analysis of Jacksonville
In finding that the ILA work stoppage in Jacksonville was a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court's opinion relies on the
theory that two controversies were present in the dispute. The first of these is the
"'underlying dispute,' . . . the event or condition that triggers the work
stoppage." 61 In Jacksonville this was the dispute between the ILA and the Soviet
Union over Soviet foreign policy. The second is the "parties' dispute over whether
the no-strike pledge prohibits the work stoppage at issue. '"62
The Court assumed that a section 13(c) labor dispute must exist for the Act to
apply. 63 Since the "underlying dispute" in Jacksonville concerned the policy of the
Soviet Government rather than "terms or conditions of employment," it was not a
section 13(c) labor dispute. However, under the Court's analysis, the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement, specifically the no-strike agreement, were "terms
or conditions of employment," and hence the dispute over the no-strike clause was a
section 13(c) labor dispute. 64 In the Court's view, once a "labor dispute" is found,
the existence of an additional, political, nonlabor dispute is irrelevant. 65 Apart from
this tortured application of section 13(c), the Court found further reasons for rejecting
the economic self-interest test: first, the congressional debates and reports on the Act
made no mention of an economic self-interest test;66 and, second, attempting to
distinguish between economically and politically motivated strikes would create dif-
ficult line-drawing problems.
67
The Court's analysis is simplistic and open to criticism on a number of grounds.
As the dissenting Justices point out, the Court's characterization of the dispute as
both a "labor" dispute and a "political" dispute is inconsistent.6 8 Moreover, the
Court's analysis is open to more substantive criticism. Realistically, there was no
substantial dispute between the employer and the union over the applicability of the
no-strike clause in the contract. The no-strike clause in the contract in question was
all-inclusive in its scope;69 it is evident that the union simply decided to violate the
clause. Thus, while the no-strike clause certainly may have been a "term or condition
of employment," it is not at all clear that there was any dispute about the clause
which would bring the work stoppage within section 13(c).
Actually, the Court's analysis, while couched in terms of section 13(c),
approaches more nearly a literal application of section 13(a). The Court suggested
that even in the absence of a dispute over the no-strike clause a labor dispute would
61. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2680 (1982).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2679-81.
64. Id. at 2680.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 2682-84. But see Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the legislative history, id. at 2688 n.4 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), and the discussion of his analysis, infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
67. See 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2684-85 (1982).
68. Id. at 2689-90 (Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting).
69. The ILA agreed that during the contract it would engage in no "'strike of any kind or degree whatsoever. ... for
any cause whatsoever." Id. at 2678.
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
have been found since, "[rlegardless of the political nature of the Union's objections
to handling Soviet-bound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage
by employees against their employer, which focused on particular work assignments.
Thus .... the employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the con-
troversy.", 70 Thus the Court implied that any work stoppage by employees is pro-
tected by the Act, a result that conforms with section 13(a) better than with section
13(c).
The Court's holding in Jacksonville is obviously very broad. If the Court is not
applying a literal interpretation of section 13(a), it is at least using such a broad
interpretation of section 13(c) that it is taking literally the language from New Negro
Alliance stating that "[tihe Act does not concern itself with the background or the
motives of the dispute.''71
B. The Dispute in Jacksonville as a Secondary Boycott
The Court appears to derive its dual dispute analysis from Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers.72 In Buffalo Forge the Court used a similar analysis to find that
while the issue of whether a sympathy strike73 violated a no-strike clause was arbitra-
ble, the "underlying dispute" was not arbitrable and hence the sympathy strike itself
could not be enjoined.74 Regardless of the validity of this analysis in the Buffalo
Forge situation, it is of little use in initially determining whether the Act applies. The
analysis simply avoids the issue of whether a substantial dispute connected to the
employment relationship is present.
In addressing that issue it is necessary first to characterize the dispute realisti-
cally. However, the ILA work stoppage does not fall neatly into any of the categories
currently being used. While it could be characterized as a protest of Soviet policy
unconnected to the employment relationship, it can also be seen as an attempt to exert
pressure on employers and other affected parties to stop dealing with the Soviet
Union-in other words, a type of secondary boycott. 75 In the secondary boycott cases
arising out of its work stoppages, the ILA has argued that its actions were directed
solely against the Soviet Union, and at least one court has agreed. 76 Most courts,
however, including the Supreme Court in International Longshoremen's Association
70. Id. at 2681 n.12.
71. 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938).
72. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
73. In Buffalo Forge production and maintenance workers had gone on strike in sympathy with striking office and
technical employees from another union. Id.
74. Id. at 405-08.
75. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976), makes it unlawful for unions:
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services;... where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease dealing with any other person ....
76. See Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.), affd, 630 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir.
1980).
[Vol. 44:821
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS
v. Allied International, Inc., have found the work stoppages to be secondary boycotts
directed at both employers and neutral parties.77
Characterizing the work stoppage as a secondary boycott makes explicit the
tension between Jacksonville and Allied International. An essential element of a
secondary boycott is the pressure it places on a neutral secondary employer with
whom the union has no dispute. 78 Thus, in Allied International the Court found that
there was no dispute between the union and the employers. 79 The inconsistency
between this finding and the Court's holding in Jacksonville is not necessarily fatal to
the Jacksonville decision. To explain this inconsistency, however, the Court would
have to admit that it is giving a broader meaning to the term "labor dispute" in the
context of the Norris-LaGuardia Act than in the context of secondary boycotts. This
the Court refused to do. 80
Nevertheless, the position that "labor dispute" has a broader meaning under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is supportable. Prior to passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947, which made secondary boycotts an unfair labor practice,8 1 several courts found
that secondary boycotts fell within the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which had
been passed 15 years earlier.8 2 Moreover, the issuance of injunctions against secon-
dary boycotts in the Duplex Printing Press and Bedford Cut Stone cases was one of
the practices against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was directed.8 3 While the
Taft-Hartley Act opened unions engaging in secondary boycotts to unfair labor prac-
tice charges, suits for damages, and injunctions obtained through the National Labor
Relations Board, there is no explicit indication in the Taft-Hartley Act of an intention
to repeal the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to secondary boycotts. 84 It is
clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to remove federal injunctive power,
even from illegal union conduct in a labor dispute, so long as the conduct does not
entail fraud or violence. 85
Thus, the conclusion of the Court in Jacksonville and Allied International-that
the work stoppage was a secondary boycott but still protected by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act-is defensible. However, it raises substantial questions that the Court
simply avoided by the means of its dual dispute analysis.
77. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Baldovin v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. See R. GomAN, BAsic Tex ON LABOR LAw 240 (1976).
79. 456 U.S. 212, 222 (1982).
80. See 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2680 n.11 (1982).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers v. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1941).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
84. See the discussion of the changes in treatment of secondary boycotts in National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 628-32 (1967).
85. This was the significance of removing the Clayton Act's requirement that strikes be "lawful" to be protected.
See F. FR.ANKsuuRiTm & N. Gea.NE, supra note 24, at 219-20.
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C. The Economic Self-Interest Theory
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Jacksonville,86 joined by Justice
Powell and-in Part I, dealing with the application of the Act to politically motivated
disputes-by Justice Stevens, focused on the language in section 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act that defines labor disputes as those "concerning terms or conditions
of employment." 8 7 The dissent characterized the work stoppage as a purely political
protest with no connection to terms or conditions of employment. 88 Chief Justice
Burger whole-heartedly adopted the economic self-interest test of the Act's
applicability. 89 He cited Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad to support the position that unions are protected by the Act only "when they
act to advance the economic interests of their members" 90 and found that "[n]o
economic interests of union members are involved; indeed, the union's policy is
contrary to its members' economic interests since it reduces the amount of available
work.' 91 Since, moreover, employers cannot resolve political disputes by conceding
to union demands, the dissent concluded that "politically motivated strikes are out-
side the coverage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' '92
The dissent's characterization of the facts of the dispute as depicting a purely
political protest is certainly supportable. 93 On the basis of that characterization no
section 13(c) labor dispute would be found if a more restrictive interpretation of the
section than the majority's were adopted. Thus, the dissenters argued that the work
stoppage in Jacksonville fell into the category of disputes that are not connected to the
employment relationship.
94
The economic self-interest test espoused by the dissent raises a number of
problems, however. The test finds little support in the language or legislative history
of the Act.95 The Act does not refer to a required motivation and, as the Court noted,
the legislative history does not support the view that Congress intended to exclude
politically motivated strikes per se from the protection of the Act. 96 Responding to
criticism during debate that the Act would prohibit federal courts from enjoining
political strikes, 97 a supporter of the Act, Representative Oliver, argued that political
strikes should not be enjoined. 98 Moreover, proposed amendments to permit courts to
enjoin strikes having "an unlawful purpose or ... an unlawful intent" and to permit
the United States to sue for an injunction were voted down overwhelmingly. 99 Simi-
86. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2687-90 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
88. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2687 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2688.
90. Id. (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1966)).
91. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 (1982).
92. Id.
93. But see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
94. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
96. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2682-84 (1982).
97. See 75 CONG. Rc. 5471-73 (1932).
98. Id. at 5480-81.
99. Id. at 5507.
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larly, in 1947 Congress rejected amendments to the National Labor Relations Act that
would have removed Norris-LaGuardia Act protections from strikes called as a result
of "disagreement with some government policy."'
100
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his dissent, all of the rejected amend-
ments swept broadly and would have excluded from the Act some strikes fitting
within the economic self-interest test. 101 Therefore, the legislative history does not
conclusively establish that Congress intended to include political strikes within the
Act. However, the repeated rejection of limiting amendments and Congress' refusal
to act on the criticism that the Act could prevent the enjoining of political strikes'0 2
hardly support the view that Congress intended to exclude political strikes or adopt an
economic self-interest test.
Moreover, section 2 of the Act indicates that the policy of the Act is to protect
workers "from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor .... in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection."' 0 3 The legislative history indicates that the
"mutual aid or protection" language was intended to recognize workers' right to
organize over issues "affecting wages, conditions of labor, and the welfare of labor
generally." 104 The Supreme Court has construed similar language in section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act'0 5 to protect much arguably political conduct.' 0 6 De-
spite this legislative history, the dissenters argued that the plain language of section
13(c) adopts the economic self-interest test. 10 7 Whatever else one may say about the
meaning of the Act, however, it should be clear that it is not "plain."
The cases that have applied the economic self-interest test have done so almost
uniformly in the context of picketing by railroad workers of nonstruck railroads.' 08 In
this context the test may have some use for determining whether the picketing has any
substantial connection with the picketers' employment through the "alignment" of
the struck and nonstruck companies.' 09 In these cases it is essentially a factual test. It
should not be converted into a motivation test and extended to cover a primary work
stoppage by a company's employees.
As the Jacksonville Court noted, the application of an economic interest test
would cause serious problems.'1 Legal tests focusing on the motivation of the parties
are always difficult to apply and should especially be avoided in the context of the
100. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2683-84 (1982) (quoting H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(13) (1947), reprinted in
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 168 (1974)).
101. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 n.4 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 2683-84.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
104. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1932).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
106. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding union distribution of literature urging members to
oppose state right-to-work constitutional amendment and to support candidates favorable to labor protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act).
107. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein at
1363.
109. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 1966).
110. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2684 (1982).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act. The abuses the Act was passed to correct arose largely out of
federal judges' practice of determining whether or not to enjoin a strike by assessing
whether the union's motives or objectives were "legitimate."' 1 1 The attempt to read
a new legitimate-objectives test into the Act is therefore questionable. Moreover, the
use of an economic interest test would cause difficult line-drawing problems, es-
pecially in cases of mixed motives.11 2 While these problems may not be insurmount-
able, it would be undesirable for the trial court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction to
depend on the judge's interpretation of whether the union's motive is "economic."
Finally, the central concept of the economic interest theory-that only a relative-
ly direct economic interest of the union justifies the infliction of economic harm" 3-
may now have been called into question by the Court. In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.," 4 the Supreme Court recently found that an NAACP boycott of
white merchants to protest race discrimination fell within the protection of the first
amendment. 1 5 Admittedly, the Court rejected a similar claim by the ILA in Allied
International,116 and extrapolation from other fields of law to labor law is risky,
especially in the first amendment context. However, the Court recognized in
Claiborne Hardware that nonlabor organizations may inflict economic harm as part
of a campaign to communicate their political views. 117 In the absence of clear con-
gressional intent to the contrary, it is difficult to see why a union's use of a work
stoppage to communicate its political views should be considered a strike with an
illegitimate objective from which the protections of the Act should be removed,
solely because of the strike's political motive. 1
8
D. The Act and Federal Labor Policy in the Context of Politically Motivated Strikes
The remedial policy, the broad language, and the legislative history of the Act
support the Jacksonville Court's view that a broad interpretation of the Act is needed
to achieve its purpose of "taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction
business." 119 By effect and implication, however, the Court's interpretation is very
broad indeed. Since, in the Court's view, the workers' refusal to work might itself
constitute a "labor dispute,"' 120 the Act becomes self-defining for the union, which
may claim the Act's protection simply by going on strike. This view may seem
surprising, but it draws considerable support from the language of section 13(a) of the
111. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 24, at 168-70, 174-75; see, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
112. See 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2684 n.19 (1982).
113. See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 193 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
114. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
115. Id. at 3423-25.
116. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
117. 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425-27 (1982).
118. It is interesting to note that in the European countries, which have had much more experience with political
strikes than the United States, legal attitudes towards political strikes vary widely. See Otto Kahn-Freund, Pacta Sunt
Servanda-A Principle and Its Limits: Some Thoughts Prompted by Comparative Labour Law, 48 TULANE L. REv. 894
(1974).
119. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960).
120. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2681 n.12 (1982).
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Act and from the Act's broad policy of protecting union efforts to improve "the
welfare of labor generally.".12 1 Moreover, it is at least arguable that a union and its
members have a legitimate interest in proceeding with a politically motivated work
stoppage. 1
22
Nevertheless, the Jacksonville Court's broad interpretation of the Act is open to
criticism that goes deeper than an attack on the inconsistency of the Court's analysis
or a dispute about the proper reading of the language of the Act. Underlying the
economic self-interest test proposed by the dissent is a view of federal labor policy,
and the Act's place within that policy, which differs radically from that of the
majority. The dissenting opinion sweeps as widely as the majority opinion, but in the
opposite direction. Since, in the view of the dissenting Justices, the protections of the
Act apply only to "union organizational efforts and efforts to improve working
conditions"123 that directly advance the economic interests of their members, sym-
pathy strikes such as the one in Buffalo Forge'24 would fall outside of the Act. In the
Jacksonville dissenters' view it would also be possible to enjoin any strike, pending
arbitration, that violated a no-strike clause of a current contract. 125 Since no-strike
clauses and agreements to arbitrate disputes are now a matter of course in virtually all
contracts, 126 the dissenters would effectively limit the application of the Act to strikes
when no contract is in effect.
A number of policy considerations underlie the dissenters' desire to limit the
application of the Act. These include the desirability of preventing disruptions of
labor peace and avoiding the damage to employers that could be inflicted by strikes
over issues the employer is powerless to resolve.' 27 These concerns are valid, even
though the employer is not entirely without a remedy.12 8 These concerns, however,
do not justify a restrictive interpretation of a broad and remedial piece of legislation
like the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The fundamental justification for limiting the applica-
tion of the Act is the view that changes in the relative strength of labor unions and in
the attitude of the federal judiciary towards them, together with modifications of
federal labor policy expressed principally in the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947,129 support limiting the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to situations in
which its "core purpose"-protection of union organizational and economic
strikes-is implicated.
130
121. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1932); see supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
123. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
124. While in Buffalo Forge all parties assumed that the sympathy strike was a "labor dispute" within the meaning
of the Act, Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that no economic interests of the production workers were at stake. 428
U.S. 397, 429 (1976).
125. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2689-90 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126. A 1974 survey found grievance procedures in 98% of sample contracts, arbitration agreements in 96% of
sample contracts, and no-strike clauses in 91% of sample contracts. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, BAsiC PATrERNS iN
UNsoN CoNRrAcrs 32, 37, 90 (8th ed. 1975).
127. See 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688-89 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 164-71.
129. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976).
130. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1970); see also Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 415-17 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The policy of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) favors conciliation
of labor disputes and permits both unions and employers to sue to enforce collective-
bargaining agreements. 131 The LMRA thus created a potential conflict with the
sweeping anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but Congress has
given no explicit guidance on how this conflict should be resolved. 132 In a series of
opinions the view has been put forward that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be
accomodated to the policy of the LMRA. 133 While these opinions have dealt with the
issue of whether a strike violating a no-strike clause may be enjoined pending arbitra-
tion, this view of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's place in current federal labor policy
appears to influence the Jacksonville dissent's view of the Act's applicability to
political strikes. Thus, the dissenters in Jacksonville would apply the economic
self-interest test to limit the protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to "union organi-
zational efforts and efforts to improve working conditions" '3 4 -the "core purpose"
of the Act. Under this line of reasoning, such a restrictive interpretation of the Act is
justified by changes in conditions and changes in federal labor policy that have taken
place since the passage of the Act in 1932.
A full scale application of this view of the Act would threaten to undercut the
broad remedial policy and purpose of the Act almost as severely as the Duplex
Printing Press line of cases undercut the Clayton Act. 135 As illustrated by the case of
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 136 even the central concerns of the
Act may be implicated by strikes resulting from political or mixed motives. In United
Mine Workers the trial court issued an injunction forbidding strikes of any kind. This
injunction was ordered after a number of strikes over arbitrable issues had arisen
during the tenure of the contract. 137 Three weeks after the trial court's order, the
union walked out to protest the importation of South African coal by a local utility
company, and the trial court held the union in contempt. 138 The Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the trial court's use of the injunction threatened to revive the
type of "government by injunction" that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to
prevent. 1
39
The United Mine Workers case also illustrates the difficulty of applying an
economic motivation test. Are the union's motives in protesting the importation of
South African coal economic (to protest competition with imported coal) or political
(to protest South African racial and labor policy)? What if the amount of coal being
imported is minimal? Or is the union's real motive simply to apply economic pressure
131. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 171, 185 (1976).
132. See Freed, Injunctions Against Sympathy Strikes: In Defense of Buffalo Forge, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 289,
291-96, 307-23 (1979).
133. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 415-22 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215
(1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2688 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
136. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 1239-40.
138. Id. at 1240-41.
139. Id. at 1245.
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on the employer through a strike over an issue not subject to arbitration and hence not
enjoinable pending arbitration under Buffalo Forge? Should federal jurisdiction to
enjoin the strike depend on a single United States District Court judge's opinion on
these matters, given the broad policy of the Act? The Court in Jacksonville thought
not.1 40
Obviously, as a policy matter, the wisdom of denying injunctive relief in cases
arising from political strikes may be questioned. However, it would not be advisable
for the Court to adopt a restrictive interpretation of a statute that Congress passed with
the express purpose of removing the federal judiciary from labor disputes, especially
after a prior law with the same purpose was rendered ineffective by judicial action.
Congress rather than the Court should decide whether the application of the Act
should be limited or the Act itself discarded as outmoded and unnecessary.
In conclusion, the Court's broad interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
correct. The Court's interpretation should rest explicitly on the policy of the Act
rather than on an unrealistic dual dispute analysis, however. 141 The policy of the Act
is to "tak[e] the federal courts out of the labor injunction business." 142 This policy
requires a broad definition of the term "labor dispute," regardless of whether section
13(a) or 13(c) of the Act is held to be controlling. A reasonable interpretation would
be that any dispute between management and labor interests concerning a present or
potential employment relationship is a labor dispute. 143 A test of this type would be
simple to apply and consistent with the policy and purpose of the Act. It would also
make clear that the workers' or union's motivations are irrelevant in the context of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that a work stoppage by employees is necessarily a labor
dispute within the meaning of the Act.
IV. REAFFIRMATION OF BUFFALO FORGE IN THE CONTEXT OF
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED STRIKES
The second issue in Jacksonville was whether the strike could be enjoined
pending arbitration. Essentially this raised the question of whether Buffalo Forge
should be overruled. This issue is highly controversial, and the positions of the
majority and dissent deserve comment. Nevertheless, this issue has already received
detailed treatment elsewhere, 144 and, therefore, the discussion here will be limited.
In the 1976 Buffalo Forge decision, the Supreme Court held that a sympathy
strike cannot be enjoined pending arbitration, despite a no-strike clause in the con-
tract, because the strike is not over an arbitrable issue. The employer may, however,
compel arbitration of the issue of whether the strike violates the no-strike clause. 145
140. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2684 n.19 (1982).
141. See supra subpart 11(A) and text accompanying notes 103-06 & 119-21.
142. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960).
143. This test is similar to the traditional "'matrix of the controversy" test. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text. However, this test focuses explicitly on the relationship between the parties, rather than on their motivations or the
subject of the dispute.
144. For an analysis of the extensive literature and a defense of the Buffalo Forge decision, see Cantor, Buffalo
Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 247.
145. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405-10 (1976).
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With this holding, Buffalo Forge placed a significant limitation on the holding in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.146 In Boys Markets the Court
had held that when a union strikes over an issue subject to arbitration under the
contract, the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accomo-
dated with the federal policy embodied in the Labor Management Relations Act
favoring enforcement of labor contracts and arbitration of disputes. 47 The Court in
Boys Markets had held, therefore, that such strikes may be enjoined pending arbitra-
tion of the dispute. 148
Although the employer and the United States Solicitor General, in an amicus
curiae brief, attempted to distinguish Jacksonville from Buffalo Forge on the grounds
that the dispute in Jacksonville was over management rights or work conditions
clauses in the contract, 149 the attempt was untenable. The underlying dispute in
Jacksonville, like that in Buffalo Forge, was clearly outside the ability or authority of
an arbitrator to resolve. It is here that the second half of the Court's dual dispute
analysis comes into play. Since the underlying dispute was with the Soviet Union, the
strike was not over an arbitrable issue and could not be enjoined.' 50 Although the
Court made this dual dispute analysis explicit in Jacksonville, it was implicit in the
Court's finding in Buffalo Forge that the strike itself was not over an arbitrable issue
even though the dispute over the application of the no-strike clause was arbitrable. 151
Therefore, the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge and the political strike in Jackson-
ville are indistinguishable or, as Justice O'Connor put it in her markedly unenthusias-
tic concurrence, "[u]nless the Court is willing to overrule Buffalo Forge, the conclu-
sion reached by the Court in this case is inescapable."' 5 2
The dissenting Justices were very willing to overrule Buffalo Forge. While
Justice Stevens simply referred back to his dissenting opinion in Buffalo Forge,153
Chief Justice Burger (who had voted with the majority in Buffalo Forge) and Justice
Powell focused on the inconsistency of the Court's dual dispute analysis and the
inconsistency between Jacksonville and Allied International. 154 The dissenters also
argued that Buffalo Forge and Jacksonville "cannot be reconciled with labor law
policy of encouraging industrial peace through arbitration."' 55
The internal inconsistency of the Court's opinion, particularly its characteriza-
tion of the work stoppage as a labor dispute for purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and as a political dispute for purposes of the Buffalo Forge issue, 156 is easy to
criticize. But this inconsistency is largely a result of the Court's unnecessary use of
the dual dispute analysis to support its conclusion that the Act applies to political
146. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
147. Id. at 250-54.
148. Id.
149. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2685-86 (1982).
150. Id.
151. 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976).
152. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2687 (1982).
153. Id. at 2690 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2689 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 2689-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2690 (Powell, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 2689 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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disputes. If the strike is realistically characterized as a secondary boycott, the Court's
result can be reached either through a literal application of section 13(a) or by
applying a broad interpretation of the Act.157 Therefore, the Court's fancy footwork
does not render its conclusion erroneous, nor does the apparent inconsistency be-
tween the Jacksonville and Allied International decisions. That one activity may be
an illegal secondary boycott under section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations
Act' 58 and yet not subject to an injunction because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
not an aberration in the Court's opinion, but is simply a reflection of the statutory
scheme enacted by Congress. The intent of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to prohibit
federal injunctive relief in cases arising out of labor disputes, regardless of whether
the activity to be enjoined was criminal or violated labor law policy.159 The in-
consistency, assuming one exists, is for Congress rather than the Court to resolve.
The most forceful objection to the Court's continued reliance on Buffalo Forge
is simply that Buffalo Forge was wrongly decided because it undercuts the federal
labor policy favoring arbitration and the enforcement of labor contracts. Overruling
Buffalo Forge would promote labor peace by preventing or quickly cutting off any
work stoppage during the life of a contract containing no-strike and arbitration
clauses. As the Court pointed out in Buffalo Forge, however, this would not neces-
sarily promote arbitration of disputes, since the union would have no grievance to
take to arbitration and the court, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, would
essentially take over the arbitrator's role of interpreting the contract. 160 Moreover,
both the Court's decision in Boys Markets and Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson 16 1 (on which his opinion in Boys Markets was based)
included a limitation on the availability of injunctions pending arbitration for strikes
"over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.''162
Although a full discussion of the policy arguments for and against overruling
Buffalo Forge is beyond the scope of this Case Comment, it appears that the Court is
acting with justified caution in refusing to limit the application of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in the absence of any specific congressional intent supporting a
limitation. Nevertheless, judging by the frequent shifts in the opinions of the Court
and individual Justices on the issue, this aspect of the Court's decision in Jacksonville
appears likely to generate continuing controversy.' 63
157. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35 & 78-84.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
159. F. FRANKRmTER & N. GREENE, supra note 24, at 199-226.
160. 428 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1976).
161. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
162. 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970) (quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
163. In 1962 the Court held in Sinclair that strikes during an agreement are protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
370 U.S. 195 (1962). In 1970 it reversed itself in Boys Markets, adopting Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair. 398 U.S.
235 (1970). In 1976 it refined Boys Markets with Buffalo Forge, expressly limiting Boys Markets to strikes over arbitrable
grievances. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). Four Justices dissented. Id. at 413. In Jacksonville the Court affirmed Buffalo Forge,
but Chief Justice Burger moved from the majority in Buffalo Forge to the dissent in Jacksonville, while Justices Brennan
and Marshall moved from the dissent in Buffalo Forge to the majority in Jacksonville with Justice Marshall delivering the
Court's opinion. 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
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V. ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYER REMEDIES
While the injunctive relief denied by Jacksonville would certainly be the quick-
est and most effective remedy for employers in cases arising out of political strikes, a
number of other remedies are available. First, under Buffalo Forge, an employer may
obtain a court order compelling arbitration to determine whether the strike violates
the no-strike clause in the agreement-with judicial enforcement of the arbitrator's
decision if the union refuses to abide by it.' 64 Second, under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 165 the employer may sue for damages arising out of a
union's breach of a no-strike clause. While this remedy will not be quick, it may be
an effective deterrent since the union's potential liability could be financially dev-
astating.
Third, under Allied International, in cases arising out of a union's refusal to
handle goods from a particular source for political reasons, the employer may charge
that the union conducted a secondary boycott in violation of section 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 166 Violation of section 8(b)(4) would open the union to
a suit for damages under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act 167 and a
cease-and-desist order from the National Labor Relations Board. More significant,
the Board itself must seek an injunction of the strike in federal court under section
10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act if it finds reasonable cause to believe a
violation of section 8(b)(4) has occurred. 168 Prior to Allied International it was not
clear whether charges could be brought under the National Labor Relations Act when
the work stoppage was directed against a foreign source, since this Act applies only to
disputes that are "in commerce." 169 Allied International settled the issue, the Court
holding decisively that the union's activity in these cases is "in commerce" and
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act. 170
Taken together, Jacksonville and Allied International have at least clarified the
law on employer remedies in cases dealing with union boycotts of goods from foreign
sources. The current situation is a definite improvement over that which existed
previously, when it was not clear whether either injunctive relief or unfair labor
practice charges were available. 17 ' The employer is not without a remedy, and the
164. 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976). Arbitrators have been held to have broad and flexible powers in formulating
remedies. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); R. GotMAN, BAsic
TExT ON LABOR LAW 591-92 (1976).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
166. Id. § 158(b)(4); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). Although the main purpose of § 8(b)(4) isthe protection of neutral secondary parties,
the courts have held that primary employers may also sue for damages under § 303. United Brick & Clay Workers v.
Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Jaden Elec. v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 211, 508 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1981).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). While the charging party loses control of the action once it is in the hands of the
Board, the reasonable cause standard under § 10(1) is less difficult to meet than the "traditional balancing of equities and
hardships." R. GORMAN, BAsic TExT ON LABOR LAW 289 (1976).
169. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a request by the Board for an injunction in one of the cases arising
from the ILA work stoppage on the grounds that the dispute was not "in commerce." Baldovin v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445, 450-54 (5th Cir. 1980).
170. 456 U.S. 212, 217 (1982).
171. See cases cited supra notes 6 & 8.
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available remedies of court-ordered arbitration and Board-obtained injunction may be
relatively qtlick and effective. Thus, the impact of the Jacksonville decision may be
somewhat diminished.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Jacksonville was strongly suggested by the broad lan-
guage, remedial policy, and background of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, especially the
Act's purpose of remedying judicial circumvention of its predecessor, the Clayton
Act. While the Court's dual dispute analysis is inconsistent and unnecessary, its
broad interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act finds support both in the Act itself
and in a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Act.172 On the other hand,
the economic self-interest test proposed by Chief Justice Burger's dissent derives
little support from the Act itself, and the notion that it is impermissible to apply
economic pressure for political reasons is now open to question. 17
3
Nevertheless, the Jacksonville decision is likely to remain controversial. It has
already received critical comment 174 and is likely to receive more in the future.
Ultimately, however, this criticism will probably be directed less at whether the
Court's interpretation of the Act is correct than at whether the result reached by the
Court is sound labor policy in general and offers adequate remedies for the employer
in particular. Yet, the sweeping policy of the Act itself has never been explicitly
repudiated by Congress. In these circumstances the proper balance between the
policy of the Act, the possibly conflicting labor policy in other areas, and the possibly
inadequate remedies for the employer should be struck by Congress rather than the
Court.
Matthew C. Lawry
172. See, e.g., Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960); United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
174. See, e.g., Rasnic, Boys Markets and the Labor Injunction Revisited: Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 33 LAB.
L.J. 704 (1982).
19831

